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This paper argues that the BP Oil Spill is, potentially, a “cultural anomaly” for institutional 
changes in environmental management and fossil fuel production. The problem as defined by the 
spill’s context, the potential solutions provided by the competing logics in that context, and the 
selection of problem-solution bundles through the fortuitous timing of events and more 
calculative efforts of institutional entrepreneurs within that context have come close to acting as 
a catalyst for deeper change; but not quite. For reasons we discuss, true change in our approach 
to handling issues related to oil drilling, oil consumption and environmental management have 




THE BP OIL SPILL 
We think we know what happened… 
On April 20, 2010, the mobile offshore drilling rig Deepwater Horizon exploded about 
41 miles off the coast of Louisiana when methane gas ran up the drilling column and ignited. At 
the time of the incident, production casing was being installed and cemented by Halliburton 
Energy Services. The explosion killed 11 platform workers and injured 17 others.  Within two 
days, the rig sank, setting off an unrestricted flow of oil from the damaged wellhead 5,000 feet 
below the surface of the Gulf of Mexico. An estimated 53,000 to 62,000 barrels of oil were 
released per day, covering 3,850 square miles in just over a week. After 88 days of unsuccessful 
attempts to stem the flowing oil, the wellhead cap was finally replaced on July 15. On September 
19, nearly five months after the initial blowout, the federal government declared the well 
officially “dead”. At this point, the BP Oil Spill became, in terms of volume, the largest 
accidental spill in history.  
 
Yet we don’t really know what happened because we don’t know what it means…  
In the public media there were multiple attributions of accountability for the disaster.  
The rig was owned by Transocean Ltd and leased to BP PLC, and some accuse engineers from 
both companies with misinterpreting the wellhead pressure test data and failing to respond to 
other warning signs before the explosion.  Others accuse BP specifically with cutting corners on 
a project that was behind schedule and over budget. Still others (including BP) accuse 
Halliburton for a poor job of cementing and testing the well head and Transocean for failing to 
maintain the blowout preventer, suggesting it had a bad valve and weak batteries. And still others 
find fault with the Minerals Management Service – the federal agency responsible for ensuring 
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that an oil rig was operating safely – accusing it of lax oversight and impropriety.    
This public battle over “fault” was itself a scripted move to stamp causality on a complex 
set of events. Like all attributions of fault and apprehension of “facts”, such moves are based on 
the current culture of understanding in which such facts are embedded. Technological and 
economic activity may be the proximate cause of environmental problems, such as the BP Oil 
Spill; but it is our individual beliefs, cultural norms and societal institutions that guide the 
development of that activity and thus shape how perceive such events – that is, our institutional 
logics (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Jennings & Zandbergen, 1995; Bazerman & Hoffman, 1999; 
Thornton, 2004; Hulme, 2009; Hoffman, 2010). When an event or issue poses a potential 
challenge to a dominant technological or economic institutional order, conflict ensues over the 
nature, meaning, and response to the event. If this challenge is significant enough to generate 
substantial conflict, the event can become a “cultural anomaly” for the current order.  
A “cultural anomaly” is a scientific finding of sufficient magnitude that it helps create a 
crisis within a given scientific paradigm, such as what Maxwell’s observations about electricity 
or Roentgen’s observations about x-rays did to the Newtonian approach to physics (Kuhn, 1970: 
52).  Jointly or singly, cultural anomalies help push us into what Kuhn (1970) refers to as 
“revolutionary science,” a period in which the pursuit of explanations and understanding results 
in the exploration of alternatives to long-held, taken-for-granted assumptions. We rely on the 
concept of the “cultural anomaly” to signal the temporal and social nature of these anomalies, 
especially the fundamental challenge they pose to actors’ identities within an existing 
institutional order.1 Variously referred to as shocks (Fligstein, 1991), jolts (Meyer, 1982) or 
discontinuities (Lorange, Scott Morton & Ghoshal, 1986), events as cultural anomalies focus 
                                                            
1 For us, an “institutional order” includes individual beliefs, cultural norms, and social institutions; each 
institution within that order itself is upheld by different s ets of ideas and actions, including by one or 
more deeper logics (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Thornton, 2004).  
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sustained public attention and invite the collective definition or redefinition of social problems 
and the actors themselves (Pride, 1995).  
Oil spills, as an observable type of ecological disaster, sometimes play this transformative 
role in the evolution of society. The Santa Barbara Oil spill is a notable example. For ten days in 
January 1969, the Union Oil Company's Platform A spilled an estimated 3.25 million (US) 
gallons of thick crude oil into the Santa Barbara Channel on the coast of Southern California. By 
mid-May, the slick had covered virtually the entire city coastline, as well as most of the 
coastlines of Ventura and Santa Barbara Counties (Scheffer, 1991). Locally, this event led to 
investigations, moratoriums on off-shore drilling, and remediation. Non-locally, the event was 
one of the lightning rods in the early 1970s that super-charged policy and legalistic approaches to 
environmental regulation (Molotch, 1970; Dowie, 1995; Hoffman, 2001).  
Will the BP Oil Spill leave the same sort of lasting legacy?  Will it represent an anomaly 
for the institutional order?  At this early stage we can begin to piece together the elements that 
will form the foundation for answering these related questions. This is not about assigning blame 
or responsibility, but about analyzing the processes by which both the problem is defined and 
solutions are formulated.  We believe that period is taking place now. 
 
CONTEXT, CONFLICT AND CHANGE  
In order to assess the full impact of the BP Oil Spill, we must consider the event as 
defined by several elemental processes.  The first process is based in the context of the event; the 
second reflects changes in our societal order.  Both are inherently political and highly contested; 
and as they evolve, we can look more deeply at the competing institutional logics that are 
exposed and guide this institutional conflict. Equally important, we can examine the role that 
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institutional entrepreneurs seek to play in shaping and guiding the change process.  In the end, a 
period of revolutionary science is a period of opportunity for these entrepreneurs to create a new 
order out of the flux that this event generates.  The various factors that can potentially generate a 
cultural anomaly are displayed in Table 1and elaborated below with regards to the BP Oil Spill.   
 
--- Insert Table 1 about there --- 
 
Event Context and Problem Definition  
The processes by which people think about and attend to an event like the BP Oil Spill 
are social and cultural, shaped by the group, organization, industry, and organizational field of 
which they are a part (March &Olsen, 1989; Ocasio, 1995; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). The 
context in which the event occurs conjures up associated events or issues which, when linked, 
foster interpretations of the problem that signal its impact.  
Examples of this contextual framing and problem identification process are many.  One 
that has become iconic is Rachel Carson’s book, Silent Spring (1962). In her commonly 
accessible, yet pointed way she argued that chemical manufacturers, by barraging the 
environment with the synthetic pesticide, dichlorodiphenyltrichlorethane or DDT, were 
poisoning the entire food chain and ultimately ourselves.  Rachel Carson did not discover the 
problems associated with DDT and the ecosystem.  She performed no research studies nor any 
technical analyses.  She was not even the first person to write about it.  The problems of DDT 
had been well documented since World War II.  What was critical about Carson's book (aside 
from her literary style) was the time in which she chose to write it.  It emerged at a time when 
people were receptive to such a message.  Much as the situation creates a leader, the context 
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creates an issue.  Had Carson written her book even five years before, it would not likely have 
caused the same level of controversy.  It may not have made any sense given the dominant logics 
of the time.  In fact, reflecting that perhaps she was just a little ahead of her time, most 
magazines turned down her initial proposals to write articles on the topic, forcing her to resort to 
writing a book.  And, after the book was completed, the New Yorker magazine faced legal threats 
and the withdrawal of advertising revenue for agreeing to serialize parts of the volume. 
In another example, if it weren't for context, it is not likely that the Love Canal disaster 
would have been noticed when it was.  In the words of Hugh Kaufman, the EPA official who 
helped expose the story, "Love Canal was a catastrophe but it wasn't the worst catastrophe in the 
country, or in New York State, or even in Niagara County."  But, he says "it was Love Canal, 
Hooker Chemical and Niagara Falls, honeymoon capital of the world.  Editors all over the 
country had orgasms.  So Love Canal became catastrophic, not any of the other 10,000 
hazardous dump sites across America" (Keating & Russell, 1992: 33). This event became a 
landmark opportunity, empowering environmental activists to wage institutional "war," given its 
conveniently sensational participants, the emerging awareness of something called hazardous 
waste sites and its coincidental timing with Jimmy Carter's presidential campaign (Hoffman, 
2001).   
One final example that relates back to oil spills is the way in which the cultural context 
defined the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill (Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001).  This was by no means the 
first, nor was it the worst oil spill in US waters.  Shown in Table 2, it ranked as the twenty-third 
largest spill in history (fifteenth largest in 1989) and the second largest in the US at the time. The 
spill that preceded it in rank occurred on November 1, 1979, when the freighter, Mimosa rammed 
the Liberian tanker, Burmah Agate, while anchored off the port of Galveston, Texas.  The ship 
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and its leaking cargo burned for five days, out of which leaked 10.7 million (US) gallons of 
crude oil.  A large portion of this oil washed up on the beaches of Galveston over the ensuing 
weeks. This event spilled 600,000 more gallons than the Exxon Valdez.  Yet, in terms of 
notoriety and punitive damages inflicted, the Valdez far exceeded it. Pictures of dying ducks and 
pristine Alaska coastline covered with oil sludge were splashed over the newsprint and TV 
media. The various ascriptions of fault, including the scenarios of the Valdez’s approach to the 
Alaskan coastline displayed in congressional committee, were trundled out daily before the 
public.  
 
--- Insert Table 2 about here --- 
 
The reason for Valdez’s dubious honor was not the scale of the accident as much as it 
was the contextual timing.  Oil spills occurring in 1969, 1979 and 1989 each are viewed 
differently depending on the dominant culture of the time.  The Santa Barbara oil spill of 1969 
represented an aesthetic concern for the beautiful beaches in that affluent community.  The 
Amoco Cadiz spill in 1978 was handled largely as a maritime issue (Hoffman, 2001).  The 
Burmah Agate was largely coded as a maritime issue, focusing on the attempts by firefighters to 
extinguish the flames on the floating wreck, keep the undamaged oil-filled compartments from 
rupturing and contain the released oil.  Coverage of the clean-up efforts on the Texas beaches 
was negligible.  But the Exxon Valdez was framed primarily as an oil pollution issue.  External 
coverage was intense, chronicling a story of a damaged environment. This made the well know 
(and disliked) company into a visible villain and the primary subject of coverage.  Fortunately, or 
unfortunately, for the Burmah Agate spill, only a low status company was fingered — the British 
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Burmah Oil Company which owned the tanker (Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001).    
Factors Driving Event Definition. Each of these events above offers an example of 
contextual factors that can drive event interpretation, including framing, visibility, and timing. 
The framing of the Santa Barbara spill and Exxon Valdez groundings as ecological disasters, one 
viewed from an ethos of the 1969 California Shangri la and the other from a 1989 portrayal of 
the “last wilderness”, captured sufficient attention in various media to allow the stories to gain 
enough steam for public rallying points to develop. Once mobilized, the various publics and their 
representatives were able to turn the events into significant anomalies. 
Ultimately, the success of framing, the visibility in multiple media, and timing depended 
on their alignment with the deeper structures of power in society. A structure for understanding 
and analyzing event attention can be formed out of several components (Hoffman and Ocasio, 
2001). The rules of the game at the time of the event guide the formal and informal principles by 
which decisions were made. The status of the players involved in the event also grant it social 
saliency (Fiske & Taylor, 1991), serving to intensify interest and increase attention on a 
particular occurrence.  Attributions for the causes of events generate further attention by creating 
clear villains and the focus of blame (Tetlock, 1990). Critical novelty and incongruity create 
greater confusion and flux within institutional arrangements by forcing interpretations to reach 
beyond the standard repertoire of codes and frames for making sense of the event.  
Most importantly, in order to become a cultural anomaly, each event had to challenge the 
identities of key actors in the paradigm or cultural epoch (Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001). Identities 
are the common norms, values, and systems of meaning by which participants establish rules of 
inclusion, competition, and social comparison among members, create distinctions within and 
between groups, and delimit group boundaries. Identity emerges in part through the collective 
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responses to external threats to the collectivity (White, 1992). It embodies meaning and sense-
making (Fiol, Hatch & Golden-Biddle, 1998) focused on answering the following questions for 
its members: Who are we? What are we? What do we do that makes us distinctive? If events 
raise these critical underlying questions, they can become cultural anomalies that alter the 
dominant institutions of society. 
Context and Problem Definition of the BP Oil Spill. To begin, the BP Oil Spill 
occurred when the rules of the game had already changed with regards to environmental issues. 
The spill occurred during a period of extremely heightened attention to environmental issues, 
both within the general public and the corporate sector – what has been called the “third wave” 
of environmental management (Hoffman, 2001; Lowitt, Hoffman & Walls, 2009). The first wave 
occurred around 1969 to 1970 with the formation of the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) as the arbiter of environmental rules and norms, and environmental management became 
synonymous with regulatory compliance.  The second occurred around 1989 to 1991 when 
industry began to take a pro-active stance on environmental protection as an issue of strategic 
importance, one that could alter markets and affect profit and loss statements (Jennings, 
Zandbergen & Martens, forthcoming; Zeitsma &Lawrence, 2010).  The third wave began around 
2008 – with the growing recognition of the interconnected nature of the global ecosystem and a 
growing concern that humans are altering it on a global scale – and had not yet diminished at the 
time of the spill (Lowitt, Hoffman & Walls, 2009).  
All of these stages were propelled by critical events (such as Silent Spring, the Santa 
Barbara oil spill, Earth Day, the formation of the EPA, Seveso, Love Canal, the termination of 
Ann Burford Gorsuch, Bhopal, the ozone hole, Chernobyl, the Mobro 4000 garbage barge, 
medical waste on east coast beaches, the greenhouse effect, and the Exxon Valdez) (Hoffman, 
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2001).  The BP Oil Spill is both the product of the elevated attention to environmental issues in 
2010 and will add to the growing momentum of the social shift that this third wave is creating. It 
comes at a time when politicians and the general public are expecting corporations to be good 
corporate actors. 
Moving to the next component, there were a great many new and old high status players 
involved in the BP Oil Spill. The first and most obvious was BP and the publically traded “Oil 
Majors” (ExxonMobil, Chevron, Royal Dutch Shell, ConocoPhillips, and Total).  BP was a very 
high profile company that had enjoyed a strong reputation for environmental sustainability 
earlier in the decade, when it broke from the other Oil Major and portrayed itself as “green,” 
along with diversifying its portfolio to include more renewable energy sources (solar and wind 
turbine).  But it had had a series of events that tarnished that reputation badly (spills at a Prudhoe 
Bay drilling rig and an explosion at a Texas City Refinery), some say to the delight of the other 
Oil Majors that BP had deliberately embarrassed. By 2010, BP had become more a part of this 
group, than a maverick green oil company standing apart from it.   
Next were the engineering firms and the regulators - technical actors. The company 
responsible for installing the casing on the well was Halliburton. The name had become 
synonymous with former Vice President Dick Cheney who is greatly despised and distrusted by 
the political left in the United States.  That association created a further sense of impropriety.  
The principal regulator at the start of the event was the Minerals Management Service. The 
improprieties that surfaced around Minerals Management (including corruption and sexual 
favors) lent an air of seediness that cemented a layer of the definition of this problem as 
unethicality, incompetence and corruption. 
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A third high status player was the Gulf States community. Having only recently suffered 
the devastating impact of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, there was a sense of compassion and shame 
that many within America feel for this community, one which assured that the BP Oil Spill 
would be framed as more than simply an environmental issue. The fact that this event occurred 
during a major recession further assured that this event would be coded, not only as 
environmental, but more prominently as economic (NewsInferno, 2010). 
A final set of high status players were the US, Britain, and associated national level 
agencies in charge of sorting out the jurisdictional issues of the spill. US President Barack 
Obama’s position on the Spill had been both visible and heavily scrutinized. Obama had 
alternatively represented the Gulf States community, the interests of the Oil Majors, the US 
national interest in not stalling the recovery from recession, and the US-British international 
alliance. This latter dynamic introduced a nationalistic element to the debate, as BP was framed 
as a “foreign” firm polluting US waters. For example, an analysis of his use of the names “BP” 
versus “British Petroleum” by the Economist magazine showed a correspondence of the usage 
rate with the intensity of negotiation over blame and damages, with the “British Petroleum” term 
peaking during the most intense period of negotiation and fault finding and dropping after BP 
agreed to substantial remediation costs (Economist, 2010).  During that same period, the British 
government signaled its increasing support of BP as a bell weather British company by 
publishing its support for the maintenance of shareholder value without liquidation or split-up.  
The identities of some of these key actors have been challenged by the BP Oil Spill. The 
spill called into question the identity of the oil industry, including BP. Prior to this event, the oil 
industry had often used the term “safe drilling” in its arguments to drill in the Alaska National 
Wildlife Refuge.  Indeed, a strong belief in the power and dominance of human engineering and 
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technology was preeminent.  The BP Oil Spill appeared to have challenged that preeminence.  
That the leak defied all efforts to stop it for 88 days was both critically novel and challenging to 
our identity as technologists. For many, this inability to cap the well was confusing and contrary 
to our beliefs about the range and control that we have over technology and the natural 
environment.  That legacy will last if the term “safe drilling” is ultimately rejected from our 
lexicon as a fallacy (just as many would like to see the term “clean coal” rejected as well). 
The American economic identity, which has been strongly anchored around fossil fuel 
use, including a reliance on foreign fossil fuels, was also challenged.  The BP Spill has been part 
of the third wave of environmental management, which is based on concerns about climate 
change, terrorism, and diminishing resources.  Climate change has driven a lot of attention 
towards renewable energy and away from fossil fuels. For many, the BP Oil Spill was a perfect 
example of the ecological hazards of relying on fossil fuels.  Terrorism, similarly, has driven a 
great deal of attention towards reducing our dependence on foreign oil.  In the last Presidential 
election, the tag line for this desire was “drill baby drill” as a call to exploit domestic reserves of 
oil. But the BP Oil Spill challenged the notion of fossil fuels exploitation completely. Some have 
sought to link the BP Oil Spill to concerns over “peak oil” given the extreme depths to which BP 
was drilling for oil. With oil running out, the argument goes, we must shift to alternative fuels; 
there is no other choice. While many are sympathetic to this argument over the long run, in the 
short run, they still feel it is simply not possible.  
  
Conflicting Institutional Logics and Solution Generation  
The solutions to problems are driven by factors occurring at the overt level of social 
information processing that reflect the deeper level of power politics. Social information 
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processing refers to how various actors in society generate, distribute, and consume information 
regarding important social issues (Stinchcombe, 1990).  Social information processing is 
inherently political and leads to contests for control among disparate players (Tetlock, 1990; 
Ocasio, 1997; White, 1992), given that their identities are associated with competing 
perspectives of institutional reality and of the meaning of the event in question. Event attentional 
processing becomes a contest over meaning among competing players in various sectors of 
society (Hannigan, 1996).  These contests generate positions and alternatives, which in turn act 
as potential solutions in situations. 
Discourse itself depends on the dominant logics and prevailing rules of the game.  
Trigger events like the BP Oil Spill offer an opportunity to explore the deeper logics that drive 
competing definitions of the problem and solution.  Defined as "axial principles of organization 
and action based on cultural discourses and strategic practices prevalent in different institutional 
or societal sectors" (Thornton, 2004: 2), logics are “the belief systems that furnish guide-lines for 
practical action” (Rao et al., 2003: 795). Because institutions inherently contain contradictions, 
multiple logics are available to individuals and organizations as they operate within them 
(Friedland & Alford, 1991).  Anomalies like the BP Oil Spill are refracted through the different 
lens of competing logics, exacerbating conflict. 
In the case of environmental issues, seven competing logics divide the public on their 
nature and importance (Hulme, 2009). Table 2 displays these logics and the positions they 
engender. Some of the logics are concerned with highly epistemological and existential issues 
(logics 1-4 in table 2), generating equally deep polarities among positions. One of the deepest 
issues around which there are competing logics is the differing ways in which we understand 
science and scientific knowledge (Logic 1 in Table 2). This logic is anchored around our 
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“expectations about what science can or should tell us” or whether “we view the authority of 
scientific knowledge in different ways” (Hulme, 2009: 74).  Within this axial dimension, some 
positions are aligned with the view that science can assess the ecosystem and has demonstrated 
negative impacts. For instance, Greenpeace describes the BP Oil spill as having “devastating 
consequences for Gulf Coast communities and the fragile wetlands, bayous, and coastal waters 
on which they depend” (Greenpeace, 2010). The potential solutions to the spill are equally 
aligned with these views. Garret Graves, adviser on coastal issues to Louisiana Governor Bobby 
Jindal, states that “I don't think there is any question that we're talking about billions of dollars in 
remedial action” (Schliefstein, 2010). 
 
--- Insert Table 3 about here --- 
 
In contrast, other positions are built around the view that in the face of the uncertainties 
of the situation and type of discipline (ecology), science cannot provide clear answers; that is, 
“[u]ncertainty pervades scientific predictions about future performance of global and regional 
regimes” (Hulme, 2009: 83). Stan Senner, director of conservation science for Ocean 
Conservancy says that "the Gulf of Mexico is a different environment” than Prince William 
Sound. Professor Ed Overton at Louisiana State University adds that “[t]here is some greater 
capacity for that environment to handle hydrocarbons" (Rohrer, 2010). As a result of these 
positions, some solutions are as extreme as that proposed by syndicated pundit Rush Limbaugh:  
"The Ocean will take care of this on its own if it was left alone and left out there…It's natural. 
It's as natural as the ocean water is" (Richard, 2010).  
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In contrast to logics about existential questions on issues like the nature of scientific 
knowledge, other competing logics are more material in nature (Logics 5, 6, and 7 in Table 3). 
For instance, there is a competing logic about how we prioritize development goals (logic 6 in 
Table 3). On the one hand, there is there is the position that nature must take precedence over 
human development.  For instance, when commenting on disasters like the BP Oil Spill, Jean-
Michel Cousteau states that: “We need to implement the precautionary principle, which requires 
the user to prove that any action taken will not cause harm. If we are not convinced, then the 
project should not be allowed to proceed, whatever the profit” (Cousteau, 2010). For Naomi 
Klein the issue runs much deeper: “the Deepwater Horizon disaster is not just an industrial 
accident – it is a violent wound inflicted on the Earth itself” (Klein, 2010). 
This kind of positioning lies in direct opposition to a belief that nature must be exploited 
for the maintenance of the society that we all enjoy.  From this vantage, environmental mistakes 
such as the BP Oil Spill are a necessary (though unfortunate) by-product of the development 
imperative.  In the words of Bob Gagosian, president of the Consortium for Ocean Leadership 
and a former director of Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, “We are going to have future 
spills, we are going to have future blowouts…The problem with human beings is that they’re 
people, and make mistakes. Let’s face it: the U.S. gets a third of its domestic oil from the gulf, so 
that’s not going away tomorrow morning. We need that oil” (Yarett, 2010). Others go further to 
claim that environmentalists are against human development, and have even caused the BP Oil 
Spill, claiming that their opposition to coastal drilling has pushed oil companies to drill deep-
water wells that are less safe (Media Matters, 2010). Sarah Palin has even argued that “extreme 
environmentalists who hypocritically protest domestic energy production offshore and onshore” 
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are actually harming the environment by pushing production (and jobs) to countries that have 
less concern for environmental protection (Media Matters, 2010).  
Perhaps the most practical issue around which these deeper logics compete is the 
appropriate role of government intervention in providing solutions and action (Logic 7 in Table 
3). For some, the role of government is in protecting public safety and responding to health 
emergencies. In this regard, they view the Obama Administration’s response as too late and too 
little. For others, any government involvement should be met with skepticism.  Some have called 
it “Obama's oil spill,” claiming that “he converted it into the crisis it has become for his own 
personal reasons and his own personal political gain” (Ryter, 2010). Rep. Joe Barton (R-TX) 
called Obama’s financial concessions from BP for cleanup costs a “shakedown” (Fang, 2010). 
Rep. Paul Broun (R-GA) has stated that “maybe” Obama is “purposeful[ly]” giving a “poor 
response to this oil spill” so he “could promote his energy tax (Fang, 2010).  Others see an even 
more sinister impact of government intervention.  In an interview with Ron Paul, Alex Jones 
reasoned that “a global governance office” has already been established “with a vice president 
over it. They’ve always wanted to nationalize oil so they get an inside deal” and the BP Oil Spill 
is an opportunity to do it (Fang, 2010).   
These seven competing institutional logics form the core of the tensions that lie within 
the debate over the BP Oil Spill as well as other environmental issues like climate change, 
endangered species protection, and clean water controls. They create positions and thereby 
solutions and alternatives that are then further refined, debated, and eventually sorted and 
selected.  
 
The Change Process  
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Institutional change is a non-rational process in the world of culture and technology. It is 
based on a sorting, matching and selection process at an institutional level (March & Olsen, 
1989; Jennings, Martin, Patient, Gravel & Yuan, 2005).  Given the multiple actors, preferences, 
institutions, and uncertainties, the outcome is driven as much by the who, when, and where of 
political positioning in the decision nexus as by the what of the technical problem; in other 
words, by many of the same features that are part of the garbage can model itself (Cohen, March 
& Olsen, 1972) - the timing of events and the actors matching problems and solutions in situ.  
Again, the Importance of Events. Events can either facilitate institutional change 
partially consistent with existing institutional arrangement or can effect a substantial alteration in 
those arrangements, one reflecting new institutional conceptions.  The first is more politically 
derived.  The second is more sudden and catastrophic in its impact. In the first case, events serve 
as a catalyst (Hoffman, 2001).  In the thermodynamic sense, a catalyst is a compound which, 
through its mere presence, facilitates a more rapid chemical reaction.  It does not force a reaction 
that would not occur otherwise.  In the same way, events can serve to hasten the development of 
the institutional issue of the moment.  They do not cause it to form.  For example, a toxic 
chemical cloud of dioxin was accidentally released from a chemical plant in Seveso, Italy in 
1976.  At that time, the banning of carcinogenic substances such as DDT was the topical focus of 
environmental regulation.  As a result, Seveso served as a catalyst for the banning of dioxin.  Ten 
years later, a cloud of methyl-isocyanate was accidentally released from a Union Carbide plant in 
Bhopal, India.  At that time, the topical policy focus was corporate disclosure of chemical 
contaminant information to employees and the local communities.  Therefore, the result of this 
incident was the development of several community right-to-know laws, including the Toxics 
Release Inventory in the United States, requiring that firms report all releases of contaminants 
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from their plants to the public.  These events did not cause the dioxin ban or the establishment of 
right-to-know legislation.  They catalyzed their institutional development (Hoffman, 2001).   
But the change process can also come from the most unpredictable of sources and have 
results far from what was intended.  For example, President Reagan's decision to defederalize the 
US government and begin by challenging the legitimacy of the EPA in 1981 proved to be a 
decisive moment in the evolution of corporate environmentalism.  Hardly considered a staunch 
environmentalist, Reagan catalyzed the initiation of an institutional shift, whereby corporations 
adopted new forms of environmental responsibilities which, just two years before, they were 
resisting (Hoffman, 2001).  In the words of Sierra Club conservation director Carl Pope, 
President Reagan "reinvented the environmental movement by his contempt for it” (Keating & 
Russell, 1992: 33).  
Ultimately, events can highlight breakdowns or failures of existing institutional 
arrangements, thereby creating chaotic shifts in the trajectory of institutional development.  They 
can identify new areas of concern that existing institutional rules or norms do not properly 
address.  For example, once identified, the Love Canal disaster profoundly changed the 
institutional face of environmentalism in the US.  For the first time, an environmental incident 
emerged as a sudden and unpredictable disaster from as innocuous a place as one's own 
backyard.  Prior to Love Canal, the notion of a hazardous abandoned waste site had no meaning 
within the dominant institutional order.  Although previously seen, it had yet to be defined and 
categorized as a major environmental concern.  Had it not been for the institutional impact of 
Love Canal, the incidents at Times Beach, Stringfellow Acid Pits and the Valley of the Drums 
might not have had much contextual meaning.  Furthermore, as a result of the ensuing 
negotiation among environmental groups, business, and the government, the institutional face of 
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corporate environmentalism was also profoundly changed with passage in 1980 of the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act - the Superfund 
(Dower, 1982).  With this legislation, industry was now assigned a responsibility for these sites, 
being held liable for actions which were legal when undertaken.  Such a notion was previously 
inconceivable.  Worse yet, a company could also be held fiscally liable for an entire cleanup 
regardless of its level of involvement in the contamination.  Love Canal profoundly changed the 
institutional conceptions of corporate environmental management (Hoffman, 2001).   
Depending on the definition of the BP Oil Spill as an event, solutions will follow a 
similar form.  It cannot be overstated that the spill occurred during one of the worst financial 
recessions in US history. This context leads to solutions in two different directions. The first is 
increased emphasis on renewable energy beyond that which was underway already. Investment 
in “green tech” had already been elevated as a major market segment before this incident and 
President Obama had been pushing the agenda.  The BP Oil Spill will catalyze that sector’s 
growth through both private and public expenditures.  The second direction is the opposite of the 
first. The financial crisis makes the notion of an extended drilling ban implausible. Therefore, we 
cannot expect a serious drop in oil exploration due to the BP Oil Spill; we can only expect a 
concurrent effort to develop alternative energy sources. 
Enter Cultural Entrepreneurs. Events, by themselves, do not do the negotiating in 
organizational fields; actors do (DiMaggio, 1988). Events empower social actors to negotiate 
while directing the form and the focus of their strategy.  Institutional entrepreneurs (Fligstein, 
1997; Lawrence, 1999) seek to shape the discourse, norms and the structures that guide 
organizational action (Maguire, Hardy & Lawrence, 2004) by inserting their interpretations of 
events into the institutional discourse. As in all field-level debates, certain individuals and 
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organizations have the ability to influence the rules of the game (Fligstein, 1990). Yet, even 
powerful actors cannot simply impose new logics and norms on a field. At some level, the norms 
must be accepted by others (Beckert, 1999). Actors that lobby for the acceptance of these new 
logics, norms, and practices illustrate the work that institutional entrepreneurs in order to create 
and build legitimacy.  
Recent discussions have taken the notion of the institutional entrepreneur further by 
acknowledging that institutional entrepreneurs do not act alone or in isolation. Individual agents 
form political networks and coalitions to act as “important motors of institution-building, 
deinstitutionalization, and reinstitutionalization in organizational fields” (Rao, Monin and 
Durand, 2003: 796). This conception provided a bridge between institutional theory and social 
movement theory (Davis, McAdam, Scott & Zald, 2005), focusing attention on the ability of 
social movements to give rise to new organizational fields and change the demography of 
existing organization fields (Rao, Morrill, & Zald, 2002).  
Consider the formation of the Valdez Principles by the Coalition of Environmentally 
Responsible Economies (CERES) in 1988. The Exxon Valdez spill empowered their emergence 
but as Joan Bavaria, one of CERES' founders acknowledges, "Valdez was really a matter of 
convenience.  It was a tragedy that moved a cause.  [The natural] environment as an investor 
issue really started up in 1981.  It was in the early part of 1988 that things really heated up when 
we had Bhopal, dirty beaches, and the big media press. We were really a reflection of changes 
going on within the environment" (Hoffman, 1996: 53).  Thus, the Valdez spill catalyzed the 
formation of CERES as an actor network. CERES itself was a catalyst for another change that 
was already underway.  In the words of Amoco's EH&S Vice President, "I think Joan Bavaria 
sensed the owner's movement and acted on it.  CERES represented a piece of what was 
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fundamentally going on, owners of corporations trying to effect change in corporate governance 
of environmental issues.  Without CERES, things could have happened as they did, but perhaps 
later.  It was part of a whole owner's movement” (Hoffman, 2001: 21). 
In the case of the BP Oil spill, all of the usual suspects lined up for commentary on the 
spill, including corporate representatives, government, environmental NGOs, and the media. 
Initially, Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal was recognized as spokesperson, declaring a State of 
Emergency after the spill and providing relief to local victims (Selman, 2010). Another 
recognized spokesperson and potential institutional entrepreneur was US Coast Guard Admiral 
Thad Allen. As head of the National Response Team he held regular news conferences, dealing 
primarily with the technical aspects of progress for capping the well and directing the cleanup.  
But as the spill continued and the technical solutions failed, opportunities for other actors 
were created. In mid-May of 2010 US President Barack Obama, and other federal representatives 
toured the Gulf State area (with Jindal), and Obama grabbed center stage with the claim that: 
“[W]e’re dealing with a massive and potentially unprecedented environmental disaster. The oil 
that is still leaking from the well could seriously damage the economy and the environment of 
our Gulf States and it could extend for a long time” (Kellerhals, 2010).  At the same time, 
excoriated by the press for his callous approach to the spill, BP’s CEO Tony Hayward retired 
early, replaced by Bob Dudley. Dudley had experience dealing with the spill, having been in 
charge of the Gulf spill group, as well as executive vice president of BP activities in the 
Americas and Asia. Dudley quickly moved to acknowledge the problem and begin the task of 
payouts for the Gulf States community: "In this change of roles, I particularly want the people of 
the Gulf Coast to know that my commitment to remediation and restitution in the region is not 
lessened. I gave a promise to make it right and I will keep that promise” (BP Company, 2010). 
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This created a platform for BP to dilute its image as a villain in this event and begin to gain 
credibility in influencing the form of the debate over the event; something that Exxon was unable 
to do in the wake of the Exxon Valdez spill. 
Oddly enough, no well-recognized spokesperson or active network arose as 
representative of the Gulf States community as a whole. In other words, unlike the Valdez and 
also Santa Barbara cases, no local coalition of representatives or specific NGOs were able to 
build directly off the event as the voice for change. Greenpeace and other NGOs made numerous 
comments on the spill, and they were consulted by the media whenever there were turns of 
events. But the limelight was never controlled by these groups, as compared to the direct and 
indirect effects exerted by exchanges between Obama and BP’s heads. Throughout the summer, 
the comments of BP and the Obama Administration (Secretary of Interior Ken Salazar, White 
House Director of Energy and Climate Change Policy Carol Browner, and others) were routinely 
published on the front pages of the Washington Post, New York Times, and other high profile 
outlets. But these commentaries were never elevated sufficiently to challenge the institution of 
oil exploration and production.  Indeed, the discourse itself was capped by the capping of the 
well on September 19th of 2010, when Obama created the following institutional lid (Levitt & 
Nass, 1989):  
“Today, we achieved an important milestone in our response to the BP oil spill – the final 
termination of the damaged well that sat deep under the Gulf of Mexico. …However, 
while we have seen a diminished need for our massive response that encompassed more 
than 40,000 people, 7,000 vessels and the coordination of dozens of federal, state and 
local agencies and other partners, we also remain committed to doing everything possible 
to make sure the Gulf Coast recovers fully from this disaster. This road will not be easy, 
but we will continue to work closely with the people of the Gulf to rebuild their 
livelihoods and restore the environment that supports them. My administration will see 





So in the end, the only two counterpoised institutional entrepreneurs that appeared to rise 
out of the BP Oil Spill were President Barak Obama and BP’s new corporate president, Bob 
Dudley. The lack of a powerful environmental voice in the framing of the BP Oil Spill meant 
that there was no effective counter-balance to the dominant logics of the oil industry within the 
public debate. The process of sorting, selecting, and matching of solutions to the BP Oil Spill 
problem was left largely to the oil company and the Obama Administration, thereby assuring that 
the framing would reflect their specific interests (economic, technological and political) and 
minimizing the perspective of prominent NGOs as to the environmental damage caused by the 
event. 
 
Interim Conclusions  
Will the BP Oil Spill become a cultural anomaly, leaving a lasting legacy on our society’s 
views towards fossil-fuels, environmental management and energy use? One answer appears to 
be “not likely.” Many of the ingredients for distinguishing a cultural anomaly have been shown 
to have been present (see Table 1). The context certainly led to a strong definition of the 
problem, and the problem challenged the identity of at least BP and the Gulf States. The conflict 
created by the event tapped all of the competing frameworks concerning the natural environment, 
but especially the belief in science and about the nature of risk, around which actors, positions, 
and solutions differed substantially. Finally, the event lead to several change initiatives, 
including how to organize regional environmental relief, how to charge multinationals for 
pollution and distribute remuneration, and the need to reduce expectations that technology can 
fix large scale operational problems in a timely manner. (For example, oil companies seeking to 
drill in places like the Alaska National Wildlife Refuge will no longer be able to argue that they 
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can drill “safely” and proponents of offshore oil drilling can no longer use the tag line “drill baby 
drill”.)  
But, while entrepreneurs appeared in the situation to link problems with positions and 
solutions, and tried to leverage the events to make larger scale changes, these large scale changes 
do not seem to have taken place. In the end, entrepreneurs never fully engaged the deeper 
competing frameworks around the environment and the event never really challenged the identity 
of the Obama Administration, the Oil Majors or the American public and its dependence on 
fossil fuels. Despite Obama’s attempts to link the event to an urgent need to invest in renewable 
energy (in a nationally televised speech), the linkage delivered by him alone did not carry the 
power to shift the debate. One reason is that the public was desensitized and skeptical as the 
same call had been made by every US President back to Richard Nixon.  Another reason is that 
the ongoing recession and the economic hazards of controls on offshore drilling overrode 
concerns for present or future environmental risks.  The economy is still fossil-fuel based and 
little serious opposition to continued offshore drilling can be expected. 
But, over time, there is a possibility that the institutional order will alter how the event is 
re-enacted, even long after it has occurred.  This is not unusual. Similar events in the past have 
been retroactively enacted to fit new social structures (Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001). The most vivid 
example may be the Cuyahoga River fire. On June 23, 1969, the Cuyahoga River caught fire for 
twenty-four minutes, causing $50,000 damage to two key railroad trestles in Cleveland Ohio. 
The cause was attributed to oily wastes dumped into the river from waterfront industries. While 
the concept of a river so polluted as to ignite would be exceptional by present-day standards, 
there was no coverage in the national press at the time. It was strictly a local event, of little 
environmental significance.  The Cleveland Plain Dealer, where the fire garnered a front-page 
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story the day after the occurrence and subsequent follow-up through the week, ran stories about 
the hazards associated with "oil slick" fires and treated the incident as an embarrassment to the 
city, complaining that “we are tired of Cleveland being the butt of a joke” and criticizing the "the 
usual amount of oily gunk that has given the river and the city a bad name for years" (The Plain 
Dealer, 6/25/69: 10-A). Yet, in more recent years, the event has been reenacted (Hoffman & 
Ocasio, 2001) as a touchstone for the genesis of the modern environmental movement (Opheim, 
1993; Browner, 1994); it was even made the subject of a popular song by Randy Newman.  Thus 
another possible answer to our opening question about the BP Oil Spill as a potential cultural 
anomaly is “perhaps in the future”. 
A third (and disconcerting) answer is “yes, but not of the type we would have hoped.”  In 
reality, the BP Oil Spill may become a “negative cultural anomaly,”  one that begins to lead to 
change, but does not, thereby reinforcing the current institutional system even more than before.  
These anomalies are the classic reactionary movements in history, such as the widespread 
conservatism that followed the French Revolution (Burke, 2006). BP itself has become an 
example of a company and CEO vilified by the US administrators and policy-makers, along with 
US-associated Oil Majors. Yet this framing has occurred, without adequate acknowledgement 
that the system of ever riskier crude oil search and refinement is the real issue, a process that BP 
was at least trying to reduce relative to its other portfolio investments in renewables. Thus, the 
responses by the Obama Administration may unwittingly represent a step backward for BP, the 
Gulf States, US energy policy, and environmental approaches to management, rather than a 
creative step forward into a better future.   
 
Case- and Problem-Based Research 
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Apart from demonstrating the possibility that the BP Oil Spill may be a cultural anomaly, 
our analysis of the BP Oil Spill has sought to make two less observable but no less important 
contributions. The first is to case-based research. Possibly failed, though high impact cases, like 
the BP Oil Spill are as important for detailed study as more obviously “successful” ones. In a 
multivariate research design, this is an obvious point; but in a case analytic approach, where we 
must be much more selective about which instances to study, it is less so (see Starbuck, 2005 for 
further commentary).  A study of the BP Oil Spill’s devolution shows that many of the 
ingredients for change were present and that opportunities for change still exist. Contrasting the 
BP case with the Santa Barbara and Exxon Valdez cases further isolates the importance of 
entrepreneurial action in change. In the former cases, entrepreneurs were part of broader social 
movements and able to link the cases to those movements (e.g., see Molotch, 1970; Jennings et 
al., forthcoming). In the BP case, the linkage of the spill with other problems and issues in the oil 
industry by institutional entrepreneurs has so far failed. This is true even though cases such as 
the Alberta Tar Sands and deep sea searches in the Arctic are all part of the same pattern of 
searching for ever “dirtier” oil as conventional reserves dry up. Thus, our paper points to the 
need to understand more deeply how social movements can leverage such events, and when they 
are unable to do so. 
A second contribution of this article is to problem-based research (Biggart & Lutzenhiser, 
2007; Davis & Marquis, 2005). Problem-based research, like any theoretical approach, draws on 
theoretical principles in its examination of problems as phenomena. Its aim is also to build, not 
grand theory, but mid-range theory. This theory is strong on context and applied constructs, but 
weaker on anything approaching covering laws. In addition, the research findings under the 
problem-based approach are designed to be robust observations – agreed upon “fact.” The focus 
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then is on finding the mechanisms that lead to facts of a similar class. In our view, few 
contemporary issues warrant social and cultural analysis by problem-focused researchers more 
than environmental sustainability issues. We have shown that theorizing and observing context, 
conflict, and change mechanisms in detail can help provide greater “rigor and relevance” in the 
assessment of our research question (Tushman & O’Reilly, 2007). We believe that social 
scientists have a duty to bring this type of research into the public sphere to help resolve such a 
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Creating a Cultural Anomaly for the Institutional Order  
 





Event setting  
• recognition, timing 
 
Event definition  
• rules of the game, status of players, 





• “Third Wave” of environmental 
management 
 
• Involves high status players; salience 
and novelty are high, given the 
prominent failure of technology. 
 
Each high status group, challenged, and 





Competition within and across logics  
• Seven competing logics 
• Existential, material, practical  
 
 
• All seven logics involved in 
environmental management are. 
challenged to varying degrees, but 






Importance of event 
• Catalyst 
• Catastrophic  
 
Cultural Entrepreneur 
• Rule changer, solution provider 
• Networks of entrepreneurs 
 
• Potential catalyzing event, but not 
catastrophic for the institutional order 
 
 
• Several potential institutional 
entrepreneurs, some new solutions; 








Worst Oil Spills in World History by Volume 
 
 Spill Name Volume Year Location 
1 Arabian Gulf/Kuwait 380-520 million gallons 1991 Kuwait 
2 Deepwater Horizon* 205 million gallons 2010 United States 
3 Ixtoc 1 140 million gallons 1980 Mexico 
4 Atlantic Empress 90 million gallons 1979 Trinidad & Tobago 
5 Fergana Valley 88 million gallons 1991 Uzbekistan 
6 Kolva River 84 million gallons 1994 Russia 
7 Nowruz 80 million gallons 1983 Iran 
8 Castillo de Bellver 79 million gallons 1983 South Africa 
9 Amoco Cadiz 69 million gallons 1978 France 
10 ABT Summer 51-81 million gallons 1991 Angola 
11 M/T Haven  45 million gallons 1991 Italy 
12 Oddyssey 40.7 million gallons 1988 Canada 
13 Sea Star  35.3 million gallons 1972 Oman 
14 Irenes Serenade 30 million gallons 1980 Greece 
15 Urquiola 29.4 million gallons 1976 Spain 
16 Hawaiian Patroit 29.1 million gallons 1977 Northern Pacific 
17 Braer 26 million gallons 1993 United Kingdom 
18 Sea Empress 19 million gallons 1996 Wales 
19 Othello 18-29 million gallons 1970 Sweden 
20 World Glory 13.5 million gallons 1968 South Africa 
21 Torrey Canyon 25-36 million gallons 1967 United Kingdom 
22 Burmah Agate 10.7 million gallons 1979 United States 
23 Exxon Valdez 10.8 million gallons 1989 United States 




Table 3:   
Competing Logics and Conflicting Positions on the Natural Environment 
 
Logics Position(s) Counter position(s) 
1. Differing ways in which 
we understand science and 
scientific knowledge. 
We must take care of nature as a 
complex ecosystem.  
Nature will take care of itself.  
2. Differing value activities, 
people, assets and 
resources.  
The ecosystem is precious. The ecosystem is only precious to 
the extent it is economically 
valuable.  
3. Differing beliefs about 
our roles in the universe. 
Humans have a moral 
responsibility to protect the 
environment. 
Humans need balanced stewardship, 
not the exaltation of horticulture 
over humanity. 
4. Differing dimensions to 
that which we fear. 
The risk is too great, given the 
large impact of this low frequency 
event. 
The risk is acceptable given the low 
frequency of this event and its large 
interim benefits.  
5. Differing ways in which 
we receive and interpret 
messages of risk. 
Credible science-based experts and 
a wide variety of reputable 
information outlets have told us 
that current resource extraction 
methods are risky. 
Well-known cultural commentators 
and high profile politicians have 
told us that current resource 
extraction methods are acceptable 
under the circumstances.  
6. Differing ways in which 
we prioritize development 
goals 
Nature’s needs to be prioritized 
over our societal needs.  
Societal needs must be prioritized, 
in all but the most extreme cases, 
over the needs of nature.  
7. Differing ways in which 
we view the appropriate 
role of government 
intervention.  
The government must respond - 
and quickly. 
The government should only 
respond as a last resort, otherwise 
the response will be simply 
political.  
Source: Based on Hulme (2009). 
 
